隨著“一帶一路”六大經濟走廊建設的推進和深入,沿線國家所存在的政治風險、投資風險、恐怖主義威脅以及地緣政治風險也越來越多地暴露出來,中亞和南亞成為困難為集中的地區(qū)。
《國家智庫報告:“一帶一路”視野下中國在印度洋四大經濟走廊的發(fā)展(英文版)》在系統(tǒng)分析中亞、南亞地緣政治熱點基礎上,提出了構建“大中亞經濟圈”、“印度洋經濟圈”和“孟加拉灣經濟圈”的建議。
General Introduction: China and the Indian Ocean in the Context of the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative
I.Major Economic Corridors in the Indian Ocean Region that China is Involved in
II.Major Risks and Challenges Facing China in the Development of the Four Economic Corridors
III.Structure of the Report
Chapter I China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: An Arduous Road Leading to the Indian Ocean
I.Security Environment in Pakistan
1.Pakistan will continue to pay a heavy price for the action against the Pakistani Taliban for a long term
2.Balochistan's security environment is not optimistic
3.The Islamic State is worsening the security situation in Pakistan
II.Progress in CPEC and Major Challenges
1.Progress in Gwadar Port and major challenges
2.Progress in the network of roads and China-Pakistan railways and challenges
3.Progress in electric power projects and major risks
4.Pakistan lacks favorable conditions for industrial and capacity cooperation
III.Conclusion and Recommendations
Chapter II Kenya-Uganda Economic Corridor: Africa's Gateway to the Indian Ocean
I. China's Strategic Goals Concerning the Kenya-Uganda Economic Corridor
1.Aligning OBOR with development strategies of Kenya and Uganda and helping them boost economic growth
2.Contributing to the Kenya-Uganda traffic corridor
3.Strengthening cooperation in energy, power and related fields
4.Fostering industrialization and manufacturing upgrading in this region
II.Major Risks Facing China in KUEC
1.Political instability in Kenya and Uganda
2.Strong influence of the United States and Britain on Kenya and Uganda
3.Increased competition from Japan in Kenya
4.Impact of political turmoil in neighboring countries such as Somalia and South Sudan
III.Conclusion and Recommendations
Chapter III Ethiopia-Djibouti Economic Corridor: A Linchpin in Eurasia and Africa
I.China's Strategic Goals Concerning EDEC
1.Boosting industrial and capacity cooperation
2.Setting up naval logistics facilities in Djibouti
3.Increasing China's influence in Africa
II.Challenges Faced by China in EDEC
1.The EDEC industrial belt is far from taking shape
2.Ethnic tensions in Ethiopia may affect political stability
3.Unstable factors in neighboring countries
4.Influence of Western countries over this region
III.Conclusion and Recommendations
Chapter IV Tanzania - Rwanda Corridor: A Route Connecting the Great Lakes Region of Africa to the Indian Ocean
I.Analysis of Political Scene in Tanzania with a Focus on President John Magufuli's Election and Administration
1.Magufuli's achievements and challenges
2.The CCM Party has increased its long-term governance capacity through elections
II.The Tanzanian Government Will Give More Attention to the Development of the Northwest Region
1.Relocation of Tanzania's capital to Dodoma will become a driving force behind the development of the country's western areas
2.The Tanzanian government has started constructing the Central Line
III.The Competitive Advantage of Rwanda will Gradually Emerge
1.President Paul Kagame has maintained political stability for a long time
2.Rwanda has developed a national strategy to prevent and fight corruption
3.Rwanda's economy has unique advantages
IV.China's Strategic Objectives Concerning TREC and Challenges Faced by It
1.China should enhance its political and diplomatic ties with Tanzania and Rwanda
2.China should promote the formation and development of the Tanzania-Rwanda Economic Corridor
3.China should cooperate with the two countries to prevent the political turmoil in Burundi and DR Congo from affecting regional development
Chapter V Building an Indian Ocean Economic Circle with the Four Corridors as Its Pillars
I.Promote Trade Creation and Optimize Trade Structure
II.Boost Industrial and Capacity Cooperation and Promote Cross-border Investment
III.Strengthen Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism and Tackle Humanitarian Crises
IV.Set up Cooperation Platform and Mechanism to Promote the Formation of the Indian Ocean Economic Circle
V. Promote the Ability of this Four Strategic Economic Corridors to Cooperate with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and other GCC countries
References
《國家智庫報告:“一帶一路”視野下中國在印度洋四大經濟走廊的發(fā)展(英文版)》:
Located in the southwestern region of Pakistan, Balochistan covers an area of about 340,000 square km and has a population of about 7.5 million. Bordered by Afghanistan and Iran, the coastal province is a key trade thoroughfare connecting South Asia to the Middle East and Central Asia. In recent years, spates of violent clashes and terrorist attacks have occurred in Balochistan. As security continues to deteriorate, Balochistan has become the region most affected by terrorist activities. Major armed groups active in this province include, among others, Balochistan Liberation Army, Baloch Republican Army and Lashkar-e- Jhangvi. In 2012 and 2013, Balochistan saw 474 and 487 terrorist attacks respectively, resulting in thousands of casualties. The main causes of these deadly attacks include disputes over resource development and distribution, ethnic and religious conflicts, and the impact of the chaos in Afghanistan.
First, the province's natural resources development and distribution is main cause of turbulence. Balochistan is extremely rich in natural resources. In addition to Pakistan's key mining areas, the province is also home to Sui, Uch and other large natural gas reserves. However, while exploiting the province's mineral wealth, the federal government of Pakistan failed to satisfy local interests and address local construction and development issues properly, triggering dissatisfaction among locals. Balochistan receives less than 10% of the annual tax contribution of about 1.4 billion US dollars to the federal government on natural gas revenue. Due to the serious shortage of funds, Balochistan's livelihood development projects are struggling. Its education, culture, sanitarian, health and other indicators are among the lowest in the country. As a result of poverty and backwardness, except a small number of cities, most areas of the province still maintain the Sardari tribal system, a hierarchy where the head is a sardar. The state administration has never been able to replace tribal chiefs in their positions of authority. When it comes to development of natural resources and related infrastructure and the increase in foreign investment and workers, tribal chiefs are frowning over the possibility of their ruling power being weakened, unfair distribution of income from natural resources in the province by the federal government and the marginalization of the local population due to the increase in foreign population. These concerns have driven the tribes to take up arms against the federal army and government.
Second, Balochistan is enmeshed in conflicts between religious and ethnic groups. In general, local armed groups can be divided into the following three categories: (1) Armed groups demanding provincial autonomy or full separation of Balochistan from Pakistan. Such organizations generally demand liberalization or the establishment of an independent state because of the unfair distribution of income from natural resources. Take Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as an example. Most members of the BLA are drawn from the Marri tribe. The goal of the BLA is to found a Great Balochistan nation for the Baloch population in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. The activities of these organizations are devastating. They have launched a string of attacks on mineral resource development, infrastructure and other projects of the Pakistani govemment. Statistics show that, between 2005 and 2014, there were 220 attacks on natural gas pipelines and security forces guarding natural gas facilities, most of which were claimed by the BLA and the Bugti tribe. (2) Armed groups seeking to gain income by kidnapping, attacks and other means because of poverty and other reasons. Although above-mentioned armed groups with political demands may also use a similar approach, relatively speaking, the behavior of politically-motivated armed groups is more extreme with easier access to intemational funding. (3) Religiously-motivated armed groups. Religious conflicts and tribal conflicts often overlap. For example, in recent years, the frequency of attacks and killings of Hazaras who are Shi'a Muslims has increased significantly. Half of the 208 sectarian clashes in Pakistan in 2013 targeted Slu'a Muslims, including Hazaras.
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